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The “Frustrated Hawks,” Tet 1968,
and the Transformation of
American Politics
Patrick Hagopian
1. The Rise of Conservatism and the “Frustrated Hawks”
1 Although the 1960s are generally remembered as a decade of leftist protest and demands
for radical change, and the year 1968 as a time of rebellion in the streets, this period has
also  begun  to  be  recognized  as a  key  moment  in  the  emergence  of  the  modern
conservative movement, which Bruce and Laurie see as the “central story of American
politics since World War II.”1 Historians of conservatism have noted that the modern
American conservative movement was born in the failed Goldwater campaign of 1964 and
achieved its first major success in the electoral gains in the mid-term elections of 1966, an
advance that was crowned with the widespread vote for conservative candidates in 1968.
As Alan Brinkley has written, “however much radical politics seemed to dominate the
public face of 1968, the most important political legacy of that critical year was the rise of
the Right.”2  
2 This phenomenon has been perceived and explained largely in relation to U.S. domestic
politics, an arena in which the rise of conservatism, largely associated with the electoral
success of the Republican party, seems much clearer than in foreign policy.3 According to
this perspective,  the appeal to the American public of  conservatism’s call  for limited
government, state’s rights, lower taxes, and individual freedoms was accelerated in 1968
by an electoral backlash against riots, protesters and the counter-culture. 
3 The rise of public support for conservative positions seems at variance, however, with the
direction of public opinion in relation to the major foreign policy issue of the day, the
Vietnam war. If we examine trends in public opinion, opposition to the war crossed an
important  threshold in 1968 when the majority of  Americans decided that  becoming
involved in Vietnam had been a mistake. The crossing of this threshold was not a hiccup
but part of an upward trend in opposition to the war, starting with the first poll that
asked the “mistake” question in 1965 and continuing steadily thereafter, with one or two
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fluctuations,  up to the withdrawal of American combat troops in 1973.  Consequently,
foreign policy does not seem to have been a part of the same backlash as one can see in
domestic politics; if anything, and apparently paradoxically, opposition to the war in the
mid- to late-1960s increased in step with the conservatism of the American electorate. 
4 This article will argue that a close examination of opinion poll results shows that the two
trends in public attitudes to domestic and foreign policy were not as far at variance as
they superficially appear. Although the majority of the public became convinced in 1968
that entering the Vietnam war had been a mistake, they were not all “doves” (people who
wanted American forces to withdraw from Vietnam more rapidly than the government of
the day wished to withdraw them).  Part of  the majority was made up of disgruntled
“hawks”: people who wanted American forces to take decisive action such as a stepped-up
bombing campaign or an invasion of North Vietnam in order to achieve victory.4 These
“frustrated hawks” became disenchanted with what they saw as the excessive gradualism
and caution of  the  Johnson administration’s  Vietnam war  policy,  and they began to
oppose the war for that reason. 
5 The overall  trend in opinion towards the war in the Johnson years—a rising number
saying  that  it  was  a  mistake  to  send  troops  to  Vietnam,  a  declining  number  who
supported Johnson’s handling of the war—is so clear that scholars have not sufficiently
recognized  the  internal  divisions  within  the  majority.  These  internal  divisions  can,
however, be teased out by comparing the results of polls that asked whether it was a
mistake to send troops to Vietnam with polls that asked whether the respondents were
“hawks” or “doves” and which of various policy options they favored. This analysis gives
us a far clearer picture of the complexity of American public opinion—and a cipher that
helps to discern the “hawkish” opinion hidden in the majority who in 1968 and after
thought  entering  the  war  had  been  a  mistake.  In  turn,  this  interpretation  helps  to
account for the latent support in the electorate for a strong military and a renewed cold
war that resumed after the period of détente in the mid- to late-1970s.
2. The Presidential Election of 1968 
6 1968, the year of international protest, did not culminate in revolutionary upheaval in the
United States;  it  ended with  the  election of  the  Republican party  candidate  Richard
Nixon, a hardline anticommunist. Both he and the third-party candidate, George Wallace,
ran campaigns based on “law and order” and “states’ rights,” an explicit repudiation of
radicalism and a coded rallying cry for conservative white voters angry at the successes
of the civil rights movement. Wallace’s and Nixon’s policies appealed to a public that
overwhelmingly believed that “law and order ha[d] broken down” and who thought a
“strong  president  can  make  a  big  difference  in  directly  preserving  law  and  order.”
According to a Harris poll, the majority of the white working class believed that “liberals,
long-hairs, and intellectuals have been running the country too long.”5 Unsurprisingly in
the context of this backlash, the combined Nixon and Wallace votes in November 1968
amounted to some 57 percent of the electorate.6 
7 A good deal of the backlash can be understood in domestic political terms: the sense by
the white working class that their position in society was being eroded as a result of
federal legislation giving African Americans rights that they had long been denied. Here,
the issue that made the 1968 civil rights act a tinderbox for white resentment was “open
housing”:  residential  desegregation  that  would  have  applied  equally  to  places  like
Chicago and Cleveland as to the Deep South.7 A portion of the white working class was
also offended by demonstrations against the war. The historian Melvin Small argues that
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the antiwar activists at the 1968 Democratic National Convention helped elect Nixon “by
alienating conservative and moderate Americans who did not like the rioting they saw on
television” (and who overlooked that the violence was in large part a “police riot”).8 In
fact, the protesters alienated even some of those who were opposed to the war.9 Analysis
of public opinion poll results shows that a majority of Americans “found the antiwar
movement, particularly its radical and ‘hippie’ elements, more obnoxious than the war
itself.”10
8 The 1968 election can be placed in the wider context of a reaction against the liberalism
of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal and Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs and the
unraveling  of  the  electoral  coalition  that  had  seen  the  Democratic  party  win  the
presidency for all but eight years between 1932 and 1968 and controlling Congress for
much of that period. Some of the core constituents in the liberal coalition, working-class
whites in the industrial north and white Southerners, became disaffected by what they
saw as the favoritism the Democratic party was showing towards minorities. The election
of 1968 was the harbinger of the Republican political strategist Kevin Phillips’s “southern
strategy,”  the  moment  that  heralded  what  he  termed  the  “emerging  Republican
majority.”11 This development made evident the exhaustion of the politics dominated by
the liberal consensus born in the New Deal; it also marked a milestone in the progress of
the modern conservative movement, which achieved a narrow victory in 1968, flourished
with  Richard  Nixon’s  re-election  in  1972,  and  reached  maturity  in  Ronald  Reagan’s
election in 1980.  The efflorescence of  this  movement into what the neo-conservative
commentator  Norman Podhoretz  celebrated  as  the  “new American  majority”  helped
Republican party candidates to win seven of the ten presidential elections between 1968
and 2004.12
9 The electoral reversal that the Democratic party suffered in the presidential election of
1968 was not simply a reaction against urban chaos, civil rights gains, antiwar protests,
and liberal failures in the domestic political arena; it was also a mark of the electorate’s
frustration at the Johnson administration’s failure to achieve either peace or victory in
Southeast Asia. “Two crises coming at once, Vietnam and violence in the cities, were too
much for us,” said Kenneth O’Donnell, once an aide to John F. Kennedy and in 1968 a
campaigner for Robert Kennedy and Hubert Humphrey.13 In 1968, the Vietnam War was
Lyndon Johnson’s war, and the Democratic party’s presidential candidate, Johnson’s vice
president Hubert Humphrey, was handicapped by his close association with this military
campaign. The Democratic party platform on Vietnam passed at the Chicago convention
supported Johnson’s policy, and Humphrey did not break with Johnson over Vietnam
until  late  September  1968.  When he  finally  distanced himself  from Johnson’s  policy,
Humphrey, who had been lagging in the polls, began to close the gap with Nixon, but not
enough to overhaul him.
10 Despite  Humphrey’s  association  with  Johnson’s  unpopular  Vietnam  policy,  the  1968
election was not a referendum about the war because there was little clear difference in
the Vietnam policies of  the two major candidates.  As Small  has pointed out,  Nixon’s
Vietnam platform “looked indistinguishable from Humphrey’s.”14 There was no “peace”
candidate on offer, even though a peace platform would have been attractive to a sizeable
chunk  of  the  electorate.  Of  the  identifiable  peace  candidates,  Robert  Kennedy  was
assassinated  and Eugene  McCarthy  failed  to  win  the  Democratic  party’s  nomination,
which was still, in 1968, controlled by big city power brokers. Humphrey did not win a
The “Frustrated Hawks,” Tet 1968, and the Transformation of American Politics
European journal of American studies, 3-2 | 2008
3
single primary election but won the nomination as a result of support by the party’s
bosses. 
11 Nixon’s  policies  on  the  war  were  deliberately  inscrutable.  During  the  campaign  he
alternated between saying that the government should remove the restraints on the use
of armed force in Vietnam and claiming that he had a plan to end the war (similar to how
Eisenhower had talked about the Korean War in the 1952 election campaign).15 He pointed
out that he had been vice president in an administration that had kept the nation out of
war for eight years. He never said that he had a “secret plan” to end the war but he
allowed a reporter’s statement that he had one to go uncorrected. The plan he actually
announced, training and equipping the forces of America’s South Vietnamese ally to take
over  the  fighting  from  American  troops,  was  electorally  popular.  (He  called  it  “de-
Americanization”; once he was in office it was renamed “Vietnamization.”)16 He had no
more intention, though, of being the “first president to lose a war” than Johnson had, but
he did not come out clearly and campaign as a pro-war candidate. 
12 Although the Johnson administration attempted an “October surprise” by announcing a
bombing halt and the beginnings of peace negotiations with North Vietnam at the end of
that month, the breakthrough was undermined by the South Vietnamese government’s
refusal to participate in the negotiations and because Nixon announced that he would
continue diplomatic efforts if he won the election.17 If Nixon’s plan was deliberately vague
and inconsistent, Humphrey’s position evolved during the campaign, particularly in the
last phase when he distanced himself from Johnson. These circumstances produced an
election in  which an antiwar  vote  might  have  gone  to  Nixon almost  as  easily  as  to
Humphrey; this, in turn, is why at first it appears difficult to assimilate the Vietnam war
into the narrative of a conservative backlash in November 1968.
3. Tet and Opposition to the Vietnam War
13 Nineteen sixty-eight was the year when most Americans turned against the war policies
of President Lyndon Johnson and decided that it had been a mistake for the nation to
involve itself in a full-scale war in Vietnam. The role of the January 1968 Tet Offensive
(named for the lunar New Year holiday) is generally considered decisive for this shift in
public opinion, marking a turning point in U.S. politics and for the first time since World
War II confronting the United States with the limits to its own power. 
14 Most  observers  agree  that  Tet  was  probably  instrumental  in  changing  U.S.  policy
precisely because of the government’s perception that the offensive had caused a shift in
public opinion. “Tet helped push the American public toward a deepening pessimism
about  the  war  and  America’s  role  in  it,”  according  to  Anthony  Edwards,  and  this
pessimism “was  instrumental  in  causing  an  alteration  in  U.S.  policy.”18 Zaroulis  and
Sullivan likewise claim that “nineteen sixty-eight was the fulcrum year,  the year the
balance scales tipped against the American effort in Vietnam.”19 Olsen and Roberts argue
that, although the Communist liberation forces did not achieve any of their tactical goals
in the Tet Offensive, it was nevertheless a tactical success because its psychological shock
effect undermined domestic support for Lyndon Johnson’s policy of gradual escalation.
Senator Robert Kennedy said that Tet “finally shattered the mask of official illusion with
which we have concealed out true circumstances, even from ourselves.” The Wall Street
Journal declared that the American people should prepare to accept “the prospect that the
whole Vietnam effort may be doomed.”20 
15 Around 80,000 Vietcong guerrillas and North Vietnamese troops launched the nationwide
offensive on January 31, 1968, simultaneously attacking 36 of 44 provincial capitals across
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South Vietnam, 64 district capitals, and five of the six major cities. They penetrated the
U.S. embassy in Saigon and held part of its grounds for six hours.21 The surprise attack
was one of the principal factors that caused Johnson not to run for re-election. Because
his administration had launched a public relations exercise in the autumn of 1967 to
persuade the public that the war was being won, the fact that the communists were able
to launch a coordinated nationwide offensive undermined the government’s credibility
and “punctured the illusion of progress” in the war. Although some have blamed media
reporting of the offensive for the public disillusionment with the war, saying that the
media misreported the offensive as a defeat for the United States,  it  was largely the
optimistic  administration  public  relations  offensive  that  set  the  conditions  for  the
adverse public reaction to Tet. The media campaign itself had been necessitated by the
sliding public support for the war, so Tet only reinforced the existing decline in public
support for the war.22
16 The public was understandably shocked by footage that showed a Viet Cong sapper unit
had penetrated the grounds of the U.S. Embassy. Although commanders on the ground
felt that they had inflicted a tactical defeat on their communist enemy when they quickly
retook most of the territory, the first shock of the offensive deeply shook the confidence
of the public. As Terry Anderson argues, “after hearing national leaders throughout 1967
proclaiming victory, the ‘light at the end of the tunnel,’ the public felt the enemy’s ability
to launch a massive attack was surely a defeat for the United States.”23 If the victory the
administration was seeking was attainable, it looked like it was years away.
17 A  “perfect  storm”  of  adverse  events  worsened  the  impact  of  the  offensive.  The
administration  had  been  trying  to  pay  for  the  war  alongside  bearing  the  costs  of
Johnson’s domestic economic programs, at the same time avoiding tax increases to fund
these expenditures. There was a limit to how long this set of policies could be sustained,
and  with  a  ballooning  Vietnam-induced  budget  and  balance  of  payments  deficit,  a
currency crisis came to a head in March, just as the shocks of Tet were being absorbed.24
Simultaneously,  the new Secretary of  Defense,  Clark Clifford,  concluded that military
victory could not be guaranteed even with the extra 206,000 troops that the chairman of
the joint chiefs of staff Earle Wheeler requested. Clifford, shortly before assuming his
Pentagon post,  said  he  did  not  understand the  reason for  the  requested increase  in
manpower:  “It  is  neither enough to do the job,  nor an indication that our role must
change.” The United States should, he suggested, send an extra half million troops or
none at all—before his questioning of the joint chiefs of staff revealed that even half a
million  more  might  be  insufficient.25 General  William Westmoreland,  whose  attrition
policy was considered to have failed and who had delivered the over-optimistic reports of
progress in South Vietnam in late 1967, was replaced as theatre commander of U.S. forces
in Vietnam. Senator Joseph Clark returned from a fact-finding visit to South Vietnam and
reported that “the war in Vietnam is at a stalemate which neither side can convert into a
military victory without leaving the country … in ruins.”26 When Johnson heard a CBS
news report in March in which the widely trusted anchor Walter Cronkite repeated that
the war appeared to be “mired in stalemate,” he concluded that he had lost the support of
middle America. With difficult news on all fronts, on 31 March Johnson announced that
he would seek a negotiated settlement of the war and that he was withdrawing as a
candidate for re-election to the presidency.
4. The Tet Offensive and Public Opinion
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18 One of the factors that contributed to Johnson’s decision was the unexpectedly strong
showing the anti-war candidate Eugene McCarthy (the Democatic Senator for Minnesota)
made in the February New Hampshire primary. Johnson was not officially on the ballot
but  voters  were  able  to  write  in  his  name  if  they  favoured  his  candidacy,  and  the
Democratic party organization had conducted a “vigorous” campaign for him. Despite
this effort, McCarthy won over 40 percent of the votes and the vast majority of delegates
in the primary. This outcome seemed to suggest a groundswell of support for a peace
candidacy. What was not recognized at the time was that the majority of those who voted
for McCarthy were Vietnam war hawks who thought that President Johnson was not
escalating the war fast enough. This was a repudiation of Johnson’s policies, but it was a
protest vote by the hawks and not by people who supported McCarthy’s antiwar stance.27
19 It may be that the results of the public opinion polls showing growing disenchantment
with the war and disapproval of Johnson’s leadership have been misunderstood in the
same way. At first glance, the story that the polls tell seems clear enough: a growing view
that entering the war had been a mistake, and growing disenchantment with Johnson’s
leadership. From August 1965 until January 1973, the Gallup Organization periodically
asked samples of the American public: “In view of developments since we entered the
fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to fight in
Vietnam?” In August 1965, 24 percent said yes. In May 1966, that number had increased to
36 percent.  In October 1967,  for the first  time a plurality of  respondents,  47 percent
(against 44 percent who disagreed) thought entering the war had been a mistake. The
numbers  fluctuated  in  December  1967  under  the  influence  of  the  public  relations
campaign  touting  progress  in  the  war.  After  the  Tet  offensive,  in  February  1968,  a
plurality of respondents again said they thought that sending troops to Vietnam had been
a mistake. In August 1968, a majority, 53 percent, took this view. The figure crept up to 60
percent in 1971 and remained there until the last combat troops withdrew.28
20 This set of figures does not support the view that Tet was decisive in turning public
opinion against the war (whatever the perception may have been that public opinion had
“turned,” precipitating a change in administration policy and Johnson’s renunciation of
the presidency). The number of public opinion poll respondents who thought sending
troops to Vietnam was a mistake passed a threshold in February 1968, but this was a
threshold that had already been passed before in October 1967. For this reason, Wyatt
considers  that  the result  of  the offensive was “less  of  a  sudden shift”  but  rather  “a
confirmation of characteristics and trends that had been around a long time.”29 Although
opposition to the war increased in 1968, the rate of increase was actually shallower than
it had been in 1967, when positive responses to the “mistake” question had increased
from 32 percent in February to 45 percent in December. The figures do not indicate that
Tet was a decisive turning point in public opinion, in so far as it can be measured by the
polls. The February 1968 (plurality) and August 1968 (majority) results may have been
milestones, but they were not turning points.
21 The trend in opposition to Johnson’s handling of the war tells much the same story.
Gallup  periodically  asked  national  adult  samples  of  the  public  to  say  whether  they
approved or disapproved of the President’s “handling of the situation in Vietnam.” A
majority approved of his handling of the war from June 1965 to March 1966. From April
1966 to June 1967, the plurality of responses shifted back and forth between approval and
disapproval. For the first time, a majority disapproved his handling of the war in July
1967.  From  then  until  May  1968,  the  last  such  poll  conducted  during  Johnson’s
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presidency, the number who disapproved his handling of the war exceeded those who
approved it. And, as John Mueller reports, approval of his handling of the war correlated
with approval of his presidency overall.30 Again, as with the “mistake” question, the trend
before  the  Tet  offensive  was  consistent  with  the  trend  afterward;  moreover,  in  the
“approval” series, the majority already disapproved of Johnson’s handling of Vietnam in
1967, so Tet was neither turning point nor milestone. As a study of local reactions to the
offensive  discovered,  by  the  end  of  February  1968,  the  offensive—although  its
repercussions were resonating decisively in Washington—appeared to have largely been
forgotten.31
22 However,  this  qualification  is  not the  most  important  one.  What  the  “mistake”  and
“approval” questions do not disclose is why the public increasingly thought the Vietnam
War a mistake and disapproved of Johnson’s leadership. Some of those who made up the
majority disenchanted with Johnson’s leadership were not “dovish” opponents of the war
as such but were hawks who had grown frustrated by the restrictions on the aerial
bombing campaign against North Vietnam and the attrition policy the ground forces
were pursuing in South Vietnam. As the Louis Harris polling organization reported in
February 1966, “more and more the American people are becoming split between those
who favor an all-out military effort to shorten the war and those who prefer negotiations
to the risk of escalation.”32 
23 The majority of Americans identified themselves as “hawks” before the Tet offensive, and
their number actually peaked in the immediate aftermath of the offensive, indicating a
wish to strike back against the communists.33 The Tet offensive therefore did not just
increase opposition to the war, it intensified the views of hawks who saw the options as
“fight or get out.” As Mary Brennan summarized, “either the military should be allowed
to use its full firepower potential, or the entire war should be abandoned.”34 Reporting on
the immediate reaction to the offensive by the public in “Middletown” (actually Muncie,
Indiana),  Anthony  Edmonds  observed  that  editorial  writers  in  the  local  press  were
extremely militant in their proposals for reprisals,  calling for,  among other things,  a
declaration of war against North Vietnam, an invasion, and destruction of “all targets of
consequence”; letter writers to the press were, if anything, more militant: “While some
cried doom, gloom, and stalemate,  others saw a chance to apply maximum force for
maximum results.”35 The poll results indicate not just a split in opinion, but also a good
deal of ambivalence, since the 60 percent who identified themselves as “hawks” in the
first post–Tet poll must overlap with the majority who, a few months later, said that
entering  the  war  had been a  mistake.  These  figures  indicate  that  among those  who
decided  that  entering  the  war  had  been  a  mistake  were  disgruntled  hawks  whose
opposition to the war grew out of frustration with the Johnson administration’s policies.
The doves and hawks “could agree on one thing: the Johnson policy, which avoided both
extremes [escalation or retreat] was doomed.”36 As George Herring described Johnson’s
predicament, he was “whipsawed between hawk and dove, still clinging desperately to a
steadily shrinking center.”37 
24 The trends in public opinion during the Nixon presidency seem to suggest a persistent
division  among  those  who  told  pollsters  they  opposed  the  war.  Nixon  pursued  his
“Vietnamization” policy, turning over the fighting to the South Vietnamese troops while
withdrawing U.S. forces, but also on occasion escalating the violence, invading Cambodia
in 1970, and conducting air raids against North Vietnam’s capital and its principal port
Haiphong  in  1972.  Vietnamization  was  popular  with  the  public,  and  Nixon’s  approval
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numbers stayed higher than Johnson’s during Nixon’s first two years in the Oval Office.38
While the slow pace of “Vietnamization” failed to satisfy the “doves,” who wanted a faster
withdrawal,  the 1972 “Linebacker” bombing raids assuaged the hawkish advocates of
unbridled air power. Admiral Sharp, Commander in Chief of U.S. Pacific Forces from 1964
to 1968,  said that  the air  campaign “will  go down in history as  a  testimonial  to the
efficiency of air power.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas Moorer,
who had advocated a U.S. invasion of North Vietnam, agreed: “Air power, given its day in
court after almost a decade of frustration, confirmed its effectiveness as an instrument of
national power.”39
25 Although during the Nixon years the number who thought entering the war a mistake
continued the upward trend of the Johnson years, a large number nevertheless favored
escalating the violence in Southeast Asia. In a 1970 poll, while almost a third of the public
favored an immediate withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam, almost a quarter still
favored  a  stronger  stand,  even  if  this  meant  escalating  the  war  by  invading  North
Vietnam. Only when combined did these two groups outnumber those willing to stay the
course with the president’s policy. This provides us with a good measure of the split in
opinion within the majority.  In a series of  polls,  Americans were asked whether they
favored an early withdrawal of troops, sending more troops and stepping up the fighting, or
taking as many years to withdraw the troops as necessary to turn the war over to the South
Vietnamese. The last option—essentially, Nixon’s Vietnamization program—had the support
of 39 percent of the public in December 1969, but this declined to 30 percent in May 1970,
with corresponding increases in the number favoring an early withdrawal or escalation.40 
26 In  January  1971,  59  percent  of  respondents  to  a  Harris  poll  approved  the  renewed
bombing of North Vietnam but 61 percent said they favored the withdrawal of U.S. troops
from Vietnam by the end of the year.41 This is one of the most striking results among the
polls discussed here, because the fact that majorities supported both options indicates
that at least some of the respondents must have wanted both renewed bombing and an
early withdrawal from Vietnam. Renewing the bombing while withdrawing forces from
Vietnam was not as illogical a course as it might sound. Aircraft based on aircraft carriers
off Vietnam’s shores and in neighboring Thailand, and B-52s based as far away as the
island of Guam could continue the aerial campaign in Vietnam without any U.S. forces
being based in South Vietnam. The majority’s support for a renewed bombing offensive as
late as  1971 demonstrates  that,  while  they wanted an end to casualties  among their
ground troops, most Americans were not ready to concede defeat. 
27 The Harris  poll’s  finding that  the public  was hawkish on bombing even though they
wanted to withdraw the combat troops is consistent with a series of Gallup polls. Gallup
offered  a  number  of  policy  options  including  a  multi-part  plan  that  involved  the
withdrawal of all the troops from the mainland of Vietnam, along with the stationing of
ships and planes offshore “to be ready to bomb any or all parts of North Vietnam.” In a
series of polls between 1966 and 1969, substantial majorities favored such a plan. These
majorities  obviously  overlapped  with  the  majorities  from  August  1968  onward  who
thought sending troops to Vietnam had been a mistake. Although they were unwilling to
meet the continued economic and human costs of the ground war, a large proportion of
the U.S. population can nevertheless be identified as “frustrated hawks.”
5. Conclusion: The “Frustrated Hawks” in the Post–Vietnam Era
28 Understanding the divisions within the majority who began to see the war as a mistake in
1968 helps us understand why no new foreign policy consensus emerged to challenge the
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cold  war  assumptions  that  led  the  United  States  into  Vietnam,  and  why  the  basic
orientation of U.S. foreign policy remained so fractious in the post-Vietnam period. The
division  of  public  opinion,  marked  by  the  three-way  split  among  administration
supporters, dovish opponents of the war, and hawkish critics of Johnson’s and Nixon’s
leadership, created lasting fissures in the polity. Within the hawks’ posture there was a
further ambivalence: a desire for victory but frustration with the conduct of the war such
that they concluded that the only option was to cut one’s losses and withdraw—without
ever  having  renounced  their  favored  option,  an  unleashing  of  more  violence.  The
resentments of the “frustrated hawks” set the stage for postwar recriminations about the
reasons for the U.S. defeat and the proper “lessons” of the war.  
29 Even before the war was over, the recriminations and the attempt to define the “lessons”
of the war began.  As anyone observing debates about U.S. foreign policy in the last 30
years will have observed, while the “Vietnam Syndrome” encouraged caution on the part
of America’s presidents and mistrust of military adventures by Congress and the public,
presidents from Reagan to George W. Bush have attempted to define the “lessons” of
Vietnam in their own ways.  
30 This article argues that we can see the rise of  conservatism not just in the backlash
against liberalism and civil rights in U.S. domestic politics,  but also in the context of
foreign policy. Although supporters of both Johnson’s and Nixon’s Vietnam war policies
declined in  number during the course  of  their  presidencies,  the  U.S.  public  had not
softened their anti-communist commitments as much as the polls superficially suggest
that they had. One of the key constituents of the electoral coalition that elected Nixon,
Reagan, and George W. Bush were foreign policy conservatives, among them former cold
war  Democrats  who had  become  disaffected  with  the  party  when  the  Johnson
administration failed to achieve a victory in the Vietnam War. This group became further
disenchanted  when  the  party  nominated  George  McGovern  as  its  candidate  for  the
presidency in 1972, and when they observed weakness and vacillation in Jimmy Carter’s
presidency at the end of the 1970s. The seeds of the cold war Democrats’ desertion of the
party were sown in the sentiments of the “frustrated hawks” who had smarted from the
sting of failure in withdrawing forces from Vietnam without achieving victory.
31 For Reagan, the Vietnam war was a “noble cause” and the lesson that he asserted in
speech after speech was that America must never again send its young men to fight in a
war that their government is afraid to let them win—a straightforward assertion of the
hawks’ line that American forces fought the war with one hand tied behind their back.
Then, in 2007 at a military veterans convention, George W. Bush uttered a Reaganesque
interpretation of Vietnam, stating that the fate of South Vietnam after the communist
victory should warn against the notion that withdrawal from Iraq would be cost-free—
another lamentation for the victory that the hawks wished they had won in Vietnam.42 As
I have suggested in this article, the roots of the continuing laments and recriminations
about America’s lost victory stem from the frustrations of the hawks that one can detect
in the reaction to the Tet offensive of 1968. 
32 Nineteen sixty-eight was not just a time of protest but of conservative backlash. This
interpretation applies not just to the United States but to many of the places where
rebellion and change were in the air. Heavy-handed repression by the authorities in West
Germany and Poland had the result, at least at first, of increasing the visibility of protests
and rallying support for them, but a transformation of those two societies did not follow.
43 In Mexico City in October 1968, soldiers and police opened fire on students protesting
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against state repression, killing dozens and beating and jailing 2000 more. In Prague, the
forces of reaction crushed movements seeking political freedoms, although they never
stamped  out  the  hopes  of  liberty  these  movements  kindled.  In  Paris,  the  de  Gaulle
presidency creaked onwards and the hopes of the rebels for liberation of the imagination
were lost in compromise. The rightward shift in American politics was not an exception
to the picture of the “year of rebellion”; it matched a pattern around the world. Amidst
the tumult of revolt and reaction, and odd though this may appear, one can trace a seed
of the conservative revival in the hawkish dissatisfaction with U.S. policies in Vietnam,
particularly in 1968, the year of world rebellion. 
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